"The Independent European Central Bank: Keynesian Alternatives" by Philip Arestis
   Working Paper No. 274 
The Independent European Central Bank: Keynesian Alternatives 
by 
Philip Arestis
University of East London 
July 1999 
I am grateful for helpful comments to Keith Bain, Victoria Chick, Paul Davidson, Sheila Dow, Ciaran Driver, Chris Fuller,
Murray Glickman, George Hadjimatheou, Harald Hagemann, Geoff Harcourt, Grazia Ietto-Gillies, Eleni Paliginis, Nick Sarantis,
Malcolm Saywer, Peter Skott, Tony Thirlwall, Jan Toporowski, Tad Podolski, to the participants of the last Keynes Conference
(Kent University), and to the participants of the of the 1999 II International Colloquium entitled Economic Dynamics and
Economic Policy (organised jointly by the Universidade de Brasilia and Universidade Catolica de Brasilia). They are not
responsible for any remaining problems. 
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it is to question the assumptions underlying the economic case for the
independent European Central Bank (ECB). Second, the paper argues that although a European Clearing
Agency (ECA) of the type Keynes envisaged for the international economy is not a panacea for the economic
problems of the European Union (EU), it is, nonetheless, a better way forward and far superior to the ECB. 
An important assumption underpinning our analysis is that there is an inherent conflict of interest between the
real and the financial sectors of the economy, with both sectors being potentially unstable. Money is not neutral
even in the long period, for money per se can cause booms and depressions (Arestis amd Howells, 1996).
Control of inflation should be no more than one policy target among many, the principal of which should be
achieving and maintaining high growth rates and full employment. There is thus no justification for the
selection of a low rate of inflation as the single most important goal of policy, irrespective of the current state of
the real economy. It is also assumed that 'market forces' are not capable of returning the economy to full
employment, so that government intervention is necessary. 
The paper commences with a brief excursion into the theoretical basis of Keynesian monetary and financial
theory, where it is shown that the power of financial institutions is located in their ability to provide credit,
which affects firms' investment plans, so that credit availability and allocation have significant systematic
effects. The section that follows aims to ascertain the extent to which credit availability is affected by the
creation of an ECB and, on that basis, to offer a critical analysis of current proposals for an ECB. The next
section looks closely at the case for the ECA, seen as performing a range of functions rather than having a
remit defined simply in terms of strict monetary control. The most important of these would be a commitment
to providing the necessary finance for full employment and a responsibility for ensuring that the burden of
balance-of-payments adjustment falls upon both deficit and surplus countries. The final section summarises
and concludes. 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF MONEY AND FINANCE
In a 'monetary-production' or 'entrepreneur' economy, contracts are an integral feature and must be
denominated in and discharged by an accepted medium of exchange, as established and upheld in civil law
(Davidson, 1982). Money thus allows entrepreneurs access to physical resources and labour required for
production. In such an economy, money is the result of credit flows, where the leading role is essentially
played by entrepreneurs. The ultimate determinant of the money supply is, therefore, 'animal spirits'.Entrepreneurs must predict the pattern of the forthcoming effective demand and infer from this and the orders
placed with them, the cash outlays required for the finance of their investment. Once this is done their loan
requirements from the banks can be ascertained and their demand for funds formulated. The future is
uncertain, so that production can only be undertaken on the expectation of future effective demand and profits.
Uncertain expectations in a non-ergodic world are potentially inherently volatile and can be falsified, thus
leading to instabilities. 
Banks lend also to speculators, which raises the possibility that speculation crowds out credit to finance
economic activity, thus exacerbating instabilities (Dow, 1993b, ch. 4). This is especially worrying given the
increasing tendency for firms themselves to engage in speculative activities. Clearly, these difficulties are all the
more serious the higher is the degree of an economy's financial openness.
Commercial banks do not passively accept deposits before they create loans. They constantly seek profits
through the expansion of their balance sheets. They make loans, create deposits in the process and meet reserve
requirements later. Given the lender-of-last-resort role and concern over liquidity and stability of the payments
system, central banks administer interest rates normally. There are occasions, however, when central banks use
quantity constraints to influence credit markets, and if a crisis threatens 'orderly' conditions in them, central
banks accommodate fully. Quantity controls, however, can be evaded by financial institutions through financial
innovations, which have an important role to play in that they transform a robust financial system to a fragile
one where liquidity is stretched.
Commercial banks set their interest rates via a mark-up on administered rates, given that precision in banks'
assessment of risk and value of collateral is unattainable. At the level and structure of interest rates established
in this process, commercial banks stand ready to provide whatever loans are required once they are satisfied on
borrowers' Credit, Collateral (which must be liquid) and Character, and so long as their liquidity preference
(determined by the state of confidence in the prices of financial and non-financial assets) and assessment of
risk remain unchanged. Commercial banks have a varied and complex set of portfolio choices to make, so that
they have their own liquidity preference.1 Changes in banks' liquidity preference influence the amount of credit
available and thus the money stock. Since banks' risk assessment is based on incomplete knowledge, their
liquidity preference changes as their perceptions of risk alter. Excessive demands on bank liquidity which
generate debt deflation imply that money could not be created unless interest rates are raised to induce
expansion of balance sheets, although banks willingness to become less liquid is also important. Commercial
banks ration credit if their liquidity preference dictates it. They actually use credit rationing because they do not
know precisely the required interest rate to compensate for risk of default (Dow and Saville, 1988; see also
Kalecki, 1937, p. 442). 
In this process there is an inherent tendency for investors to increase the level of their indebtedness, and in
moments of optimism they do so rapidly. If lending institutions share this optimism, demand from the private
sector would be accommodated. However, such a bank-financed expansion leaves the corporate sector in a
vulnerable financial position, and the additional supply of finance for investment by banks reduces their
'margin of safety'. The vulnerability of both firms and banks is heightened as a result (Minsky, 1982a, 1986).
This increased financial fragility2 is not in itself a constraint on growth, but it will disrupt the process of
expansion if it turns into debt-deflation, which can be triggered by changes in expectations and consequent
attempts to re-establish liquidity positions. The increase in liquidity preference affects real expenditure through
changes in interest rates, in long-term expectations, and, most crucially, in the availability of funds for
investment, which thwarts the growth process. 
There is thus a close interdependence between developments in the real and monetary sectors. The monetary
sector assists the development of the industrial sector through channelling finance to it. But instability in
financial relations can cause volatility in investment, so that the commercial banking sector can affect the course
of events in the real part of the economy. Developments in the real sector of the economy, essentially in
investment and its financing, influence monetary and financial events. The prosperity of the industrial sector,
for example, has a beneficial effect on the monetary sector, maintaining its solvency and enabling it to innovate
and enhance its ability to service the industrial sector. 
In the open economy additional considerations are in order: the type of exchange rate regime, the phase ofeconomic cycle and the state of the trade account are crucial (Dow, 1986-87). In a flexible exchange rate
regime, exchange rates are determined by both real and monetary factors. The health of the real economy, as
proxied by movements in relative profitability and productivity and thus competitiveness, is a fundamental
explanatory variable, as are relative interest rates, themselves influenced by speculation (Arestis, 1989). In the
expansion phase the less flexible exchange rates are, the greater the scope for capital inflows, given relative
interest rates. An expected improvement in relative profitability encourages local and foreign investors to buy
domestic assets, thereby increasing the supply of finance. Mutatis mutandis, in a contraction the less flexible
exchange rates are, the more the scope for capital outflows so that the contraction phase is more severe than
otherwise, which worsens the downturn. 
There are, also, trade account effects on the supply of finance which operate through changes in the ratio of
imports to exports. Changes in the trade account affect the supply of finance in such a way that the amplitude
of economic cycles is mitigated in a regime of fixed exchange rates. When flexible exchange rates prevail, even
if full adjustment to the ratio of imports to exports were to occur, speculation can lead to destabilising
international capital flows. In an open economy, liquidity is responsive to expected changes in relative interest
rates and in expectations of exchange rate adjustments, both of which can be destabilising. Thus international
money flows are potentially a source of instability. Openness, therefore, enhances the destabilising power of
financial markets in that they do not necessarily provide countries with international liquidity when they most
need it; nor do they always absorb unwanted liquidity. 
Economic openess is also the cause of divergence amongst economies. Deficit countries are normally faced
with weak currencies and capital outflows instead of a balancing capital inflow, and they are thus obliged to
reduce levels of economic activity. Surplus countries, by contrast, experience buoyant levels of economic
activity with no need or incentive to adjust (Kalecki, 1946). All these propositions are consistent with and
compounded by Thirwall's Law which suggests that international financial payment imbalances can have
destabilising influences upon the real economy (Thirwall, 1979).
The preceding analysis is applicable not just to the more developed EU 'core' countries, but also to the EU
'peripheral' countries. Banking sectors in these countries, rather than the stock market or other financial
institutions, are the main source of finance for investment. The supply and the average maturity of loans made
available for investment are determined by banks' liquidity preference, in addition to demand. Since the
countries' financial markets are underdeveloped, banks' liquidity preference is high and thus lending activity is
low. In any case, banking sectors in the EU periphery are within the remit of the state, and as such they are
used primarily to finance government deficits. Any lending to the private sector that may take place is in the
form of short-term loans to finance consumption and speculation. The relatively slow pace of banking
developments along with slow income growth mean, then, that these monetary sectors do not have a strong base
for their operations. As a result they are not in a position to innovate to the same extent as in the core countries
and are thus less equipped to contribute to development. Development is in turn not robust enough to enhance
the position of the banking sector.
We thus arrive at Chick's (1986, 1989) stages of banking development with their different characteristics,
where the capacity of banks to create credit depends crucially on their stage of evolution. This capacity is
enhanced as banks become more and more independent from reserve requirements, thereby making the supply
of credit more responsive to demand. This analysis suggests that the higher is the degree of integration of EU
banking systems the more independent they become, and the greater is their ability to influence the volume of
credit in the Union (see,also, Dow, 1993a). EU banking systems are not at the same stage of development, and
banks at similar stages of development operate differently, as, for example, banks in Britain and Germany
which are viewed as polar cases in their roles in industrial finance (see Pollin, 1995). This raises the question
of what will be the outcome when financial systems which operate in rather different ways and which were
previously separated are brought together. This is particularly relevant in the case of peripheral countries, where
banking systems differ substantially from the ones in the core countries in terms of stages of banking
development. The existence of a weak banking sector and the weakness of the real economies in the periphery
mean that these countries will be unable to withstand competition from the banking corporations of the core
countries in the environment of the single European market. They will thus be vulnerable to take-overs, with the
result that banking in peripheral economies is likely to be dominated by large international banks. The financial dominance of the centre implies that the higher is the degree of EU financial integration, the
greater is the degree of periphery vulnerability. This would be exaggerated by both borrower and lender
attitudes. Savers in the periphery would tend to opt for acquiring financial assets at the centre which, with its
competitive edge, is always able to offer high-return and low-risk assets relative to the periphery. Funds
drained away from peripheral countries are unlikely to return from whence they originated (Chick and Dow,
1988). Lenders would have a high liquidity preference and consequently a low propensity to provide credit.
The locus of credit creation and allocation and thus the financial power would concentrate in a few financial
centres well outside the periphery. 
These differences in banking development entail a serious problem which relates to the fragility of the EU
financial system. Financial innovations, which are a distinct characteristic of the more advanced stages of
banking development, create more financial opportunities but at the same time more total debt. The higher is the
total debt to GDP ratio, the more financially fragile a country is. To the extent that such creation is
uncontrolled, fragility can develop into instability (financial liberalisation can produce precisely the same
results; see Davis, 1992; Studart, 1993; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). EU banking systems which are at
similar stages of development can still have different total debt to GDP ratios and thus being susceptible to
different degrees of financial fragility and instability. Given the financial dependence of periphery on the
centre, fragility and instability ultimately spill over to the periphery. 
This analysis suggests that monetary shocks will have differential effects upon the EU economies. In
particular, peripheral countries will be less able to cushion themselves against contractionary monetary shocks
than core countries. In the latter cases, these shocks can be neutralised, potentially, by the operations of
commercial banking sectors operating at the more advanced stages of banking development and are thus less
reserve-constrained. The more underdeveloped banking systems cannot so easily neutralise deflationary (and
inflationary) shocks. In addition, the financial reliance of these countries on institutions which operate outside
their frontiers has serious implications. Finance in peripheral countries has taken the form of borrowing on the
international capital and money markets. Banking is no longer national. This internationalisation of banking
has meant that whilst financing in the past had been channelled through direct investment, in peripheral
European countries direct investment has become inadequate and international bank finance began to replenish
the shortfall. The operations of these financial institutions upon which the peripheral countries so much
depend, may not be conducive to the interests of these countries, unless national control governments exercise
some form of control over their operations (Arestis, 1992, ch. 10).
INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECB
In this section we comment on the independent European Central Bank as initially put forward in Delors
(1989) and EC (1992), which is essentially how it was implemented on 1 January, 1999 (for more details see
Arestis and Sawyer, 1999). The ECB is part of the attempt at European Monetary Union (EMU) and is the
single locus of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which has been formed from the voluntary
union of national central banks, and the ECB itself. National central banks have not been abolished; they have
become merely operating arms of the ECB. The ECB assumes responsibility for EU monetary policies, but it
is the Council of Ministers and not the ECB which is empowered to conclude agreements on the exchange rate
system in relation to non-EU currencies and to change the central rates for the single currency within the
system. The final say, therefore, on the exchange rate, rests with the Council of Ministers and not with the
ECB.
Under these arrangements all foreign exchange controls have been removed, exchange rates are irrevocably
fixed and national currencies would eventually be replaced by a single currency, the EURO. The primary
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, using whatever monetary policy is necessary regardless of
the costs involved in unemployment and lost output. Furthermore, the ECB will support the Union's objectives
within the framework of free-market principles. In pursuing these objectives the ECB is completely
independent of the institutions of the Union and member state governments.4 It thus enjoys political
independence, a view which is consistent with the free-market notion that the main danger to financial stability
is not the activities of market agents but the workings of elected governments, which makes necessary an
independent check on public spending. The central bank is thus given the responsibility for avoiding the
inflationary finance of government deficits, thus becoming an instrument of control on government and not anagent of economic policy.5 
These arrangements for the ECB are flawed, both theoretically and institutionally. The most serious springs
from the heart of the case for an ECB, which is that inflations are monetary in origin and as such they should
be tackled by monetary policy alone as required. But if inflations are non-monetary in origin, using monetary
policy to fight inflation would be inappropriate and would have detrimental effects on output and employment.
Also, it is pointless demanding that the ECB attempt to control the money stock when this is essentially
endogenous (Arestis and Howells, 1996), which raises the question of how price stability is to be achieved in
the absence of any other policy instrument. Central bankers, with their heavy emphasis on 'sound' money, are
prone to pursuing deflationary policies without giving sufficient attention, if at all, to full employment and
growth targets. This would heighten, rather than mitigate, financial fragility, since interference with the credit
system in the fight against inflation, causes interruptions to the production process. A further difficulty arises
from the crucial assumption that appointed central bankers are to be trusted more than elected governments.
The danger with this view is that since central bankers see themselves as the custodians of international capital,
the formation of monetary policy would be subject more to the interests of international financial capital rather
than to those of the EU.6 These problems prompt two further questions which relate to accountability and
'bank supervision'. The ECB is insulated from political pressures and as such does not appear to be
accountable. But without complementing the measures to ensure independence with others to quarantee
accountability, political support may not be maintained. There is also the question of 'bank supervision' which
is not tackled in the proposed monetary European system. This particular consideration prompted Kregel
(1993) to argue that the real hurdle to European Monetary Union is lack of this type of supervision and could
very well become the most awkward challenge to the ECB. He suggests that 'the major prerequisite for the
successful functioning of the universal bank system throughout the EEC would be the creation of a single EEC
agency with responsibility for bank supervision, independent from the European Central Bank, but which
cooperates closely with it' (op. cit. , p. 675). 
The ECB system envisages a single currency as a further step on from the fixed exchange rate system. This
along with the abolition of controls on capital movements increases the problematic nature of a movement to
fully fixed exchange rates with a single currency, both by increasing the difficulties faced by weak currencies
and countries and by removing the capacity of governments with an anti-inflation stance to sterilise the effects
of inflationary tendencies within the system as a whole. Furthermore, as recent EMS experience has
demonstrated, in a world of free capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate system covering more than just a small
number of countries which are very similar in economic performance, will face regular disruptions with
disturbing consequences not only for exchange rates but also for unemployment levels. 
There is also the problem that since EU countries have different labour-market institutions, this may lead to
divergent wage and employment patterns. Supply shocks for example would affect wages and prices
differently in these countries, thus causing adjustment difficulties in the presence of irrevocably fixed exchange
rates. A related problem highlighted by the recent experience of the German unification, is that in a currency
union there would be a strong pressure on the wage structure of the weaker members to adapt to the highest
existing wage levels of the strongest countries. So long as productivity increases lag behind wage increases
(due to the obsolete capital stock of these countries), problems on the employment front may ensue, thereby
increasing substantially the need for transfer payments to levels which it may not be possible to finance in the
face of strong political resistance.7 
Membership of the ECB system required the fulfilment of certain stringent criteria8 that most countries found
extremely difficult, and some (for example Greece) impossible, to meet (see Arestis and Sawyer, 1999, for the
problems those criteria entailed). Furthermore, independence by itself does not establish anti-inflationary
credibility since correlation between price stability and central bank independence does not imply causality. A
good example in this context is Germany's experience with inflation. While part of the inspiration behind an
ECB comes from the German experience of low inflation and the alleged independence of the Bundesbank,
institutions and psychology appear to have played a much larger role. But the glaring omission from the
convergence conditions is any mention of output or employment considerations. They clearly suggest that
price stability is to be pursued through the free market mechanism rather than through positive interventionist
measures to encourage economies to absorb rising costs by productivity increases and not by higher prices. 'Euromonetarism' is established as a deliberate policy choice. The impact on countries of attempting to meet the
conditions has inevitably been asymmetrical (Arestis and Sawyer, 1999). The attempt to conform to them has
produced different levels of unemployment and output growth in different countries and, even more
emphatically, in different regions (Arestis and sawyer, op. cit.). Bean (1992) finds the fiscal convergence
conditions in particular 'positively harmful... and ... Since the rules are asymmetric ..... the consequence will be
a contractionary bias to fiscal policy for some time to come' (p. 48), especially so if the cause of budget deficits
is a private sector surplus of savings over investment. This bias will limit any boost to output and growth which
might emanate from the completion of the monetary union. And even without the asymmetry, the boost is
expected to be negligible (De Grauwe, 1992, p. 81). For the peripheral countries, the cost is likely to be high, in
view of their inefficient public sectors and tax evasions due to their underground economies. Equally serious
for these countries is the immense pressure they face not to restructure their economies, but to reform their
economic policies to adhere to the convergence criteria. Resultant policies of fiscal stringency and high interest
rates (aiming at propping up their currencies) would weaken these economies further. 
Turning briefly to the issue of the Union fiscal policy, as distinct from rules governing the fiscal policies of
individual member states, the following comments are in order. Single currency areas in single countries apply
fiscal policies which automatically act to transfer funds to poorly performing regions through lower taxation
revenues and higher government transfer payments in those regions. In addition, most countries engage in
explicit discretionary regional transfers through government grants and/or taxation allowances. The EU allows
for the second of these types of transfer, although their size is entwined with the general issue of the size of the
EU budget and very little attempt has been made to relate them to the increased imbalance likely to result with
EMU or attempts to achieve it. Transfers resulting from the operation of automatic stabilisation do not occur at
EU level, so that the check on the decline of weak areas which emanates from this economic mechanism is
absent. Also, given the lower degree of labour mobility across national borders rather than within them, the full
and final loss of the exchange rate instrument requires an adequate policy of regional transfers through a
Union fiscal policy to accompany the proposed common monetary policy. This issue is even more serious
given the limitations on the fiscal deficits of individual members and the controls over methods of financing
them imposed as part of the movement to EMU.
A related issue is the relationship of monetary policy to fiscal policy. In EMU, coordination between monetary
policy and fiscal policy is very difficult, if not impossible. This is so since the independent central bank is
responsible for monetary policy whilst fiscal policy remains in the hands of national governments. It would not
be unrealistic to assume, though, that within a monetary union the fiscal budget is bound to be set up at the
Union level, precisely because of the enormous problems that lack of coordination of these policies would
entail. However, once the fiscal budget is set at the Union level, national governments will not be able to
monetise their deficits. There are, already, two major rules in this context: first, there should be no monetary
financing of public sector deficits under any circumstances, and second, there should be no responsibility to
bail out any member state which gets into budgetary difficulty (they are actually bound by the conditions of the
Stability and Growth Pact; see, for example, Arestis and Sawyer, 1999, for more details on this pact). Union
lending to 'profligate' states that run into trouble should be on extremely tough and restrictive terms. Since the
option of monetisation of public deficits will not be open to national governments, a considerable element of
'discipline' is, thus, introduced. Under these circumstances the financial system becomes more fragile,
especially in the peripheral countries, with further adverse effects on the real sector of the economy. The ECB
would be in no position to cope with these effects given its emphasis on 'independence' and monolithic
concentration on inflation. Under these circumstances EMU could actually damage, rather than enhance, the
long-term prospects for European unification. 
The argument against the ECB is consistent with liquidity preference theory and uncertainty as expounded
earlier. The ECB would not provide the stability required for a successful European monetary system. Lack of
such a system means that liquidity preference is high in view of uncertainty, which keeps interest rates higher
than they would otherwise be, thus affecting investment, employment and income adversely. What is needed,
therefore, is a system to provide stability which would reduce or eliminate excess supplies or demands for
currencies, thus enabling the volume of European trade to expand, which would contain uncertainty and reduce
liquidity preference. With lower interest rates, economic activity should be stimulated across countries. The
issue for alternatives must therefore be addressed. This is the theme of the section that follows.KEYNESIAN SCENARIOS FOR EUROPEAN MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS
It should be clearly stated at the outset that whatever the institution or system one envisages in this context, it
should be primarily concerned with levels of output and employment, rates of economic growth and inflation as
well with national and regional balance. Keynes (C.W. XXV, p. 75) was in favour of a system which would
aim at checking contractionist tendencies.9 For the 'main cause of failure' of any payments system was its
inability to foster continuous global economic expansion when persistent current account imbalances prevail.
Keynes was suggesting that this failure was due to the single characteristic of imposing the main burden of
adjustment on debtor countries. 
Keynes's plan10 was the creation of an International Clearing Union (op. cit. ; also the Appendix in Thirlwall,
1987), a supranational central bank, with its own currency, bancor, the value of which would be defined with
respect to gold. Each country would fix its currency in terms of bancor with margins of fluctuation allowed.
Bancor would be accepted as equivalent to gold by members who would agree to accept the transfer of bancor
through the Union in settling international balances. Bancor would be used only for clearing purposes among
countries and the Union would be entirely responsible for the accounting of the whole system. Countries could
only buy bancor from the Union; they could not sell them for gold. Bancor reserves could never leave the
system, so any possibility of a run on bancor is eliminated. Each member's quota of bancor, allocated
according to their previous levels of imports and exports and envisaged to be variable by agreement, would
supplement its reserves, and the Union could also make overdraft facilities available. Countries would be
charged with interest when their holdings of bancor deviated from zero in either direction, so that an incentive is
introduced for both surplus and deficit countries to seek adjustment. 
Surplus countries, which would have credit in their accounts with the Union, should consult with the governing
body on the best measures to be implemented by them to alleviate the imbalance, including revaluation of their
currencies, if their credit with the Union exceeded half of their quotas. A credit balance unused for a certain
period of time would be cancelled automatically. A deficit country whose debit exceeded a quarter of its quota
could implement, without permission from the Union, a 'once-for-all' reduction of 5 per cent in the value of its
currency. If the deficit continued and grew to half its quota, the Union could enforce devaluation of a
magnitude it saw necessary. Creditor countries would be under no similar direct compulsion to revalue their
currencies, so that even in this plan deficit countries surrendered control over their own exchange rates. 
Keynes's plan, therefore, recognises the importance of devising a mechanism that requires surplus countries to
bear the main burden of adjustment of balance of payments disequilibria, without at the same time removing all
responsibilities from the deficit members. This would be helped by the adoption of a combination of fixed but
adjustable rate system to reduce the possibility of massive currency misalignments. Keynes also recommended
two additional institutions: the Board for International Investment aimed at ascertaining investment needs and
their financing across countries, and the International Economics Board to maintain price stability and control
of the Trade Cycle.
Kalecki (1946), too, was mindful of the disadvantages of the scenario whereby the burden of adjustment falls
on deficit countries with weak and small economies. He argued that eventually this would have deflationary
consequences not just for the weak but also for the stronger countries, thus imparting a serious deflationary
bias to the system. Kalecki insisted that 'no country will experience difficulties in balancing its foreign trade if
all countries maintain their expenditure on goods and services at a level adequate to secure full employment
with no export surplus in existence' (op. cit., p. 323). This could be arrived at, if each country maintained full
employment 'based on domestic expenditure and on net foreign expenditure financed by international
long-term lending' (op. cit., p. 327). He insisted that any international monetary arrangement which precluded
full employment as priority would simply fail. Surplus countries should stimulate their imports and hence the
exports of the deficit countries. An international clearing union and an international investment office should be
established, the aim of which would be to provide enough short-term and long-term lending facilities to help
overcome foreign exchange difficulties (Kalecki and Schumacher, 1943; Kalecki, 1946). So, although Kalecki
had not provided a comprehensive proposal for an international monetary system, he was, nonetheless,
advocating the creation of international financial institutions which were similar to Keynes's scheme.A proposal which is very much in the spirit of Keynes but without the requirement of an international central
bank, is that put forward recently by Davidson (1992-93). Davidson argues for an international institutional
agreement which 'does not require surrendering national control of local banking systems and fiscal policies'
(p. 158). He envisages a 'double-entry bookkeeping clearing institution' with an International Money Clearing
Unit (IMCU), essentially deposits of the central banks with the Union. The IMCU is to be used as a unit of
account and reserve asset for international liquidity which is to be held only by central banks. This would be
the only reserve asset for international financial transactions with guaranteed one-way convertibility, from
international money to domestic money, in which case 'there can be no draining of reserves from the system'.
Overdraft facilities with the specific aim to utilise short-term unused credit balances would be made available.
The exchange rate between national currencies and the IMCU is left to each nation, at least initially. Although a
fixed exchange rate system is envisaged, changes in parities are allowed to reflect permanent changes in unit
labour cost and current account deficits at full employment. Changes in the exchange rates should take place
gradually and at stipulated magnitudes per period.11 If the deficit nation is a poor country, the suggestion is for
a transfer from the richer surplus countries of some of their excess credit balances to the debtor nations. In any
case, creditor countries which accumulate unused IMCU reserves would lose them, so that an incentive to
stimulate these economies is introduced. 
The clear implication of this proposal is that effective demand does not decrease as a result of the deficit in the
poorer countries and also that grants and direct investment are channelled to them. There are essentially three
problems with Davidson's proposal. First, there is Kalecki's (1946) argument that mere transfer of excess
credit balances to the debtor nations could not be relied upon to produce a satisfactory permanent solution,
unless an international agency is set up to satisfy long-term financial needs. The second difficulty is that in this
proposal co-ordination of the activities of the national central banks is left to them, thus raising the necessity of
obtaining agreement, which may not be forthcoming - unless, of course, countries that are reluctant to
co-operate realise that ultimately membership of the Union which allows collaboration is the only way forward.
The third difficulty relates to the stipulated changes in exchange rates which would cause massive speculation
on the currencies involved. Clearly some form of control of speculative capital flows would be necessary in
these cases, a requirement which can actually be incorporated in Davidson's proposal. 
EUROPEAN CLEARING AGENCY
The proposal suggested in this paper relies heavily on Keynes's, Kalecki's and Davidson's views. This makes it
imperative to consider the principal ways in which the economic landscape has changed since Keynes and
Kalecki made their proposals for an international clearing union. They are:
(a) The dominance of purely international financial motives over the needs of trade in foreign exchange
markets has made speculation a considerably more potent force than in the days of Keynes's international
clearing union. This has been helped by better communication and other technological advances. 
(b) The usual objectives of economic policy of the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (full employment and healthy
growth rates, balance-of-payments 'equilibria', etc) have been displaced by the single objective of ensuring the
confidence of 'markets'.
(c) We now have an international monetary non-system which is characterised by dominant players who are
only prepared to consider deflationary policy options: high real interest rates, lower PSBRs, squeezes on
welfare spending, and in more general terms, avoidance of expansion because the financial markets see it as
'inflationary'. This has been accompanied by the removal of capital controls, which leads inexorably to high real
interest rates as the price of avoiding a flight of capital. In Europe and elsewhere, capital markets have become a
destructive monster with, inevitably, severe deflationary outcomes.
(d) The growth in the volume and international mobility of capital and the relative strength of international
capital vis-a-vis single governments has been such as to increase substantially the degree of difficulty of
controlling capital movements in the modern world. Similar problems were actually identified and discussed
both during the Bretton Woods era (for example, Tobin, 1966) and before it (for example, Kaldor, 1939).
Keynes (C.W. XXV) recognised the dangers for an organised international system of capital mobility and
responded with a variety of proposals aimed at restricting international capital movements. What has changedsince then is that these difficulties have become more transparent in that the expectation of a devaluation
produces a flight of capital of dimensions that central banks find difficult to manage.12 
(e) Central banks at the time of Keynes were more in control of the ability of financial systems to create credit
and establish interest rates. Recent financial developments, liability management, the liberalisation and,
especially, the internationalisation of financial markets, imply that 'national central banks take a step down,
becoming single banks in a world-wide system, not at the 'centre' any longer' (Hicks, 1967, p. 60). Central
banks, therefore, do not possess the type of control necessary to intervene successfully in financial markets. In
any case, central banks are less willing to exert the type of control over banks which was taken for granted at
the time of Keynes, nor are they prepared to initiate the degree of co-operation necessary to re-establish control
over financial markets.
Our proposal for the EU attempts to take account of these developments. Its key features are as follows:
it is firmly based on Keynes's (C.W. XXV) and Kalecki's (1946) insistence on full employment.
There should be a clear recognition that such a commitment entails symmetric and reciprocal rights
and responsibilities between surplus and deficit countries. Such commitment should reverse current
tendencies to put the emphasis on 'market confidence'. 
the establishment of a European Clearing Agency (ECA) charged with powers to enforce its
objectives. 
alongside and under the aegis of the ECA there should be a European Investment Agency (EIA) to
provide long-term lending. 
a fixed but adjustable exchange rate system. 
anti-speculation measures to mitigate instabilities and fragilities. This would allow exchange rate
policies to be determined by forces other than erratic capital movements.
Our proposal, as in Kalecki (1946), has as a major priority that of achieving and maintaining full employment
for all EU countries.13 Two elements which derive from Keynes (C.W. XXV) are also embedded: that both
creditor and debtor countries should be responsible for balance of payments imbalances, and that any
payments system should avoid built-in deflationary tendencies. In this latter sense it is essential to stress the
importance of a fixed exchange rate system with sufficient flexibility to guarantee that any imbalances are not
translated into policies which always result in unemployment. There should be, therefore, a minimal agreement
over paths of unemployment/employment, growth and inflation for all member states to achieve full
employment. Whilst employment and growth should be recognised as explicit policy objectives, realistic
inflation rate paths are also important. But there should be a clear recognition that increases in money wages
above productivity normally lead to higher prices and that a degree of inflation is inevitable. In this sense
insistence upon inflation rates around zero are totally unrealistic.
We propose the establishment of a European Clearing Agency, with personnel appointed by national
governments reporting to some democratically elected body. The ECA would issue a European Clearing Unit
(ECU) to serve as a medium of exchange and reserve asset. The ECA would issue ECUs in return for gold,
dollar and other reserves of member central banks. ECUs should be held only by central banks,14 and in more
general terms the ECA would operate as an institution which would periodically settle outstanding balances
between central banks. The ECA would, therefore, be a 'double-entry bookkeeping clearing institution',
providing overdraft facilities so that unused credit balances could be mobilised effectively. Also, it would be
committed, along with its member central banks, to guaranteeing one-way convertibility from ECU deposits to
domestic money. 
There is an important difference between this proposal and Davidson's. The Davidson proposal suggests that 'a
single Supranational Central Bank' would be feasible and desirable within the EU which 'would operate as a
single unit in the larger global clearing union' (Davidson, 1992-93, p. 158, n. 7). We have argued above that
such a system in the EU in the form of an ECB would be both undesirable and devastating in its effect if it
were to be implemented.
A European Investment Agency should also be created, run and controlled by the ECA. The EIA should havetwo specific aims: first, to provide finance for long-term investment, especially to the peripheral countries which
need to industrialise in a way that does not increase dependency. Second, to provide long-term lending facilities
to those countries which need them to avoid foreign exchange difficulties. This particular ingredient of our
proposal relies heavily on the proposition that different European countries are at different stages of banking
and economic development. As such, European countries should not be expected to run continuously balanced
current and capital accounts. The EIA attached to the ECA would provide the necessary long-term lending
where the emphasis should be on strengthening the real sector of the borrowing economy, and in the case of
peripheral countries such lending should be linked to industrialisation. If these conditions are not met, changes
in exchange rates may be required. Creditor countries should also be expected to introduce appropriate policies
to reduce their surpluses. Most important, though, is the suggestion which relies on Kalecki and Schumacher
(1943), that in extending loans to countries the EIA should have the power to direct borrowers to use the loans
to increase their imports from countries which have deficits in their balance of payments but are not themselves
in the process of industrialisation (see also Harcourt, 1993). In all these it is essential that the functions and
activities of the ECA and the EIA are linked and co-ordinated very closely. 
Industrialisation of the EU periphery is an important ingredient of this proposal. In addition to the EIA, it
would require the creation of more localised institutions charged with the objective to produce an economic
order in which finance serves economic growth and development. From the point of view of this paper regional
banking, where regions can be countries, is the most relevant. The argument for regional banking is based on
the premise that financial institutions, banking in particular, play a vital role in regional growth and development
(Chick and Dow, 1988). More concretely, peripheral countries in the EU are characterised by volatile credit
creation, which is absorbed by the centre especially in periods of high liquidity preference, since this is
satisfied by holding assets issued in the core. The financial centre acts as a magnet especially for large
corporate investors who possess market power and thus better access to credit. As credit creation is
increasingly centralised, concentration of production becomes concomitant with financial concentration. This
remoteness of financial markets from the business of the periphery discriminates against firms and projects
there, with the added implication that the periphery experiences tight financial constraints. An asymmetry in
regional credit creation and thus in regional development ensues. Regional banking should be expected to
alleviate this problem, and also enhance regional growth and development. One envisages, for example, a
network of regional public investment banks which would have close ties with local industry and the EIA.
Since they would have knowledge of the Credit, Collateral and Character of all major borrowers in the regions,
they would be in a better position than European-wide institutions, to boost the capacity for local industrial
initiative. 
A system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates should accompany the establishment of the ECA, which raises
the question of the frequency and the manner of exchange rate adjustments. As in Davidson's (1992-93)
proposal, changes in parities can take place whenever money wages and profit margins relative to productivity
are permanently out of line, or when countries experience chronic difficulties in their balance of payments for
other reasons. In the case of the peripheral countries, transfer of credit balances from surplus countries should
be a requirement, but only to the extent that peripheral countries are prepared to undertake positive steps at
industrialising their economies. In general terms the ECA would be given the power to use sanctions to enforce
behaviour in line with the objectives of the system, including realignment of currencies whenever necessary.
This would reduce the degree of the difficulty, identified in Davidson's proposal, that co-ordination of activities
of the national central banks be left to them. 
Pursuit of anti-speculative measures to allow exchange rate policies to be determined by the criteria referred to
above, rather than by speculative capital movements, is another dimension of our proposal. Two such measures
suggest themselves: the imposition of capital controls, and the taxing of transactions in the foreign exchange
market. Under an adjustable exchange rate system speculative pressures are inevitable. Capital controls could
potentially contain if not eliminate speculative pressures so long as there is cooperation and coordination of
economic policies among the ECA members. It would be desirable to have cooperation amongst the world's
nations on this front but such an arrangement may have to wait until the establishment of an international
monetary system more akin to the proposals discussed in this section. One form of capital controls which may
rely less on coordination is the imposition of substantially high reserve requirements on banks and other
financial institutions against their foreign exchange transactions, including transactions in financial derivatives
(these are innovations in foreign exchange markets, such as futures, swaps and options).15 Since these reserverequirements would be at zero interest rate, they would impose a cost on foreign exchange speculation which
would increase as interest rates rise, thus expected to dampen speculation. Here again, banks could potentially
evade these types of controls, in view of the internationalisation of their operations. However, 'substantially
high' reserve requirements which discriminate against evaders, may very well discourage banks from attempts
of this type. 
The other possibility referred to above is the tax on foreign exchange transactions. What this entails is
Keynes's suggestion in the Treatise on Money (C.W. VI, ch. 36) that to contain speculative capital movements
it may be necessary to tax foreign lending (see also Tobin, 1966, 1978). It re-surfaced in the early 1990s in
relation to the severe speculative attacks on the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (Neuburger and Sawyer,
1990, p. 116; Kelly, 1993, 1994), and more recently in view of the severe financial crises around the globe
(Arestis and Sawyer, 1997). Without any financial costs in the transfer from one currency to another, even a
minimal risk of devaluation can precipitate a crisis by causing a large-scale shift out of the troubled currency. A
transaction tax increases the required interest rate differential necessary to cause speculation, and as such it is
expected to contain it. It must be recognised, though, that the possibility always exists that such a tax could
potentially be passed on by speculators. A multinational company, for example, could raise the price of its
product, and commercial banks could raise their 'profit margins' by spreading the costs around. A further
problem is that a tax on spot transactions could lead to foreign exchange transactions driven offshore. The
offshore problem would have to be tackled by developing a transaction tax in collaboration with other countries
(Dornbusch, 1990). 
These problems not withstanding, beyond the obvious advantage of being a source of government revenue,16
the transaction tax should contribute to an orderly realignment of currencies whenever this was necessary.17
But just as in the case of controls on capital movements, effective imposition of such a tax may have to cover
not just the EU but all the countries in the world under the aegis of a revamped international monetary system.
Some go even further and suggest that since it is speculation in all asset markets that is responsible for the
observed market instability, a moderate world-wide tax on all financial transactions would produce 'stabilising
speculation' (Dornbusch, 1990). The success of such an endeavour, though, would require co-operation and
policy co-ordination amongst countries. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have argued in this paper that the proposals to create an ECB is open to a range of far-reaching objections.
The experience of the ERM in the early 1990s provides some validation of the views expressed in this study on
the problems the ECB might encounter. Alternative possibilities have been considered drawing on Kalecki and
proposals suggested by Keynes and more recently by Davidson. This discussion has enabled us to consider a
proposal for the EU which relies to a large extent on their suggestions.
Central to our proposal is the creation of the twin institutions of the ECA and the EIA, with the system relying
on two important ingredients: fixed but adjustable exchange rates, and controls over capital movements to
counteract speculative attacks on EU currencies. The objective of the ECA and the EIA is to enable the EU to
achieve and maintain a full employment path. The role of these new institutions in this endeavour would be to
provide the necessary credit to member countries to finance expansion and tackle any balance of payments
deficits that may arise in the process. 
The system proposed for the EU could very well develop into one resembling Davidson's proposal for a world
monetary system, and Harcourt's (1993) more recent plan to 'save' the world which envisages both revamping
existing international institutions and creating new ones similar to what is proposed in this paper. Indeed, it
could very well emerge in what Keynes (C.W. XXV) was hoping his international clearing union might
become: 'the pivot of the future economic government of the world' (p. 1989).
NOTES
1.  Minsky (1982b) went as far as to suggest that bankers' liquidity preference (and that of businessmen)
is 'the essential liquidity preference in a capitalist economy' (p. 74). 
2.   Financial fragility is mitigated by the existence of secondary markets (where transactions areundertaken in old securities). Their role relies on continuous trading, which provides the liquidity that
is necessary to make it less risky for wealth-owners to hold long-term securities (C.W. VII; Chick,
1992). The thinner/thicker secondary markets are, the more/less speculative and volatile financial
markets become. Consequently, financial intermediaries have an important role in supporting a
financially stable process of growth and development. But there is, also, a negative side, which is the
instability that can be brought about by the speculative nature of these markets. 
3.   The ECB would be the single locus of the independent European central banking system. This
system consists of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which would be formed from the
voluntary union of national central banks, and the ECB. A central board would run the ECB which
would be responsible for initiating and implementing monetary policy. 
4.   There are three stages leading to the establishment of the ECB. Arestis and Bain (1993) provide a
comprehensive coverage of these institutional details and a critical analysis of the reasons for an
international central bank, and therefore an ECB, along with the question of the willingness of
governments to entrust powers to an international, and/or European, central bank, independent or
otherwise. 
5.   A further example of the attempt to insulate the ECB from political pressures for inflationary finance,
is that the six members of its Executive Board are appointed for eight years in office and will not be
re-appointed. The members of the Governing Body will serve for five years. This body includes the
governors of the national central banks who, presumably, will be immune from political pressures,
given that member countries are expected to strengthen the independence of their central banks. 
6.   Coakley and Harris (1983) chronicle relevant examples from UK's 20th century experience, which
support very strongly the points made in the text. 
7.   A good example of this argument is current developments in the old East Germany. This experience
also provides more than a mere hint as to what might be in prospect in a European Currency Union. 
8.   There are four criteria actually: (i) a high degree of price stability close to that of the three best
performing member states; (ii) 'healthy' government finance, defined as a maximum ratio of 3 per cent
government deficit to GDP at market prices, and a maximum ratio of 60 per cent of government debt
to GDP at market prices; (iii) observance of the normal ERM fluctuation margins for at least two years
without any devaluation among the member state currencies; and (iv) long-term interest rate levels
which do not exceed two percentage points from the nominal long-term government bond rates of the
three best performing member states in terms of price stability. There is also the additional
requirement that legislation for Central Banks independence should be in place prior to joining the
EMU. 
9.   Keynes (C.W. XXV) elaborated on the undesirable contractionist tendencies as follows: 'No
depositor in a local bank suffers because the balances, which he leaves idle, are employed to finance
the business of someone else. Just as the development of national banking systems served to offset a
deflationary pressure which would have prevented otherwise the development of modern industry, so
by carrying this analogy into the international field we may hope to offset the contractionist pressure
which might otherwise overwhelm in social disorder and disappointment the good hopes of our
modern world' (op. cit. , p. 75). 
10.   The international clearing union was not the only international monetary plan that Keynes proposed.
Williamson (1983), Moggridge (1986) and Meltzer (1989) analyzed the proposals Keynes put
forward between the publication of his first book Indian Currency and Finance (1913), the Tract
(1923) and the Treatise (1930) and other contributions in the 1920s and 1930s and the international
clearing union of the early 1940s. Common elements of these proposals were, amongst others, that 'a
new international currency to be issued by a world bank' should be created, there should be measures
to avoid an undesirable deflationary bias being built into any international monetary arrangement,
capital movements should be subject to controls, and that exchange rates should be managed (a
number of writers have shown that Keynes never advocated freely floating exchange rates; see, for
example, Meltzer, 1989). 
11.   There is the question here of the effects of exchange rate changes, since the evidence is not always
unambiguous. Krugman's (1991) assessment of the relevant evidence is that exchange rate changes
facilitate adjustment. The adjustment, however, could very well be due to the income effects resulting
from exchange rate changes, rather than to the substitution effects (Davidson, 1992-93, p. 164, n. 16).
Furthermore, changes in the exchange rate may not be effective if the balance-of-payments problem
emanates from the capital account due to heavy international debts. This would require the union tobring together the debtor and creditor countries in negotiation to solve the problem (op. cit. , p. 164).
Interestingly enough, Kalecki (1943) was very pessimistic about the impact of devaluation. He argued
that price elasticities of demand for exports and imports were low and, also, that competitive
devaluations by surplus countries may very well ensue. 
12.   It has been argued (Williamson, 1992/93) that a 'target zone' system might alleviate the problem of
controlling capital mobility. Under this system, countries negotiate 'a set of mutually consistent targets'
by fixing real exchange rates and rates of growth in nominal domestic demand for each country. In
this way internal and external balance can be achieved, and capital movements absorbed, by allowing
exchange rates to fluctuate within a zone of plus or minus 10 per cent around the exchange rate that
reconciles internal and external balance. Such a system, however, by permitting discrete realignments
is bound 'to be subject to speculative attacks if such a realignment is thought to be imminent' (Bean,
1992, p. 32), although if a credible commitment to make only small and infrequent realignments is
made, speculative attacks may be mitigated if not entirely eliminated (Currie, 1993). But even in such a
flexible system capital controls seem to be an essential requirement given the ability of internationally
mobile capital to find its way around. This proposal still relies on debtor countries to initiate the
required adjustment of current account imbalances, and as such it does not address the essential
requirement for a sound international monetary system, which is that the onus of adjustment should
fall on surplus as well as deficit countries. This is a weakness which would worsen rather than
ameliorate the problem with speculative capital movements. 
13.   This is not to suggest that in the Keynes and Davidson plans the full-employment objective is
ignored. Very far from it; they do recognise its importance. The only difference, and it is a minor one,
is that in Kalecki's argument the full-employment objective is particularly emphasised. 
14.   It could be that Williamson's (1992-93) criticism that 'where central bank assets were distinct from
those held by the public.....is not of such strategic importance as to justify the effort' (pp. 188-89),
may be applicable to the international monetary non-system. But it certainly cannot be applicable to the
EU, where new ways of organising its monetary affairs are so much needed, especially when they can
overcome the problems experienced recently. Such a system is one that differentiates amongst assets
held by the central monetary authority and the public. 
15.   The proposal put forward in this paper is similar to Kregel's (1989) in many respects, but there is one
important difference relating to capital movements. In Kregel's proposal control of capital movements
is not envisaged. Capital flows in his model 'could be part of an automatic, profit driven, arbitrage
mechanism which would allow free capital flows at fixed rates of exchange' (p. 20). 
16.   It is estimated that imposition of a 0.5 per cent tax on foreign transactions (estimated to be in the
order of £200 billion per day) by the Bank of England would yield around £1 billion of revenue every
day. A PSBR of around £40 billion per year, roughly equivalent to the UK's current PSBR, would be
covered in just over a month (Kelly, 1994). 
17.   In the context of a flexible exchange rate regime, the transaction tax by reducing capital flows should
help to mitigate the volatility of exchange rates. 
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